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Abstract
Punitive damages are a tool for punishing defendants who engage in reckless and wanton behav-
iors that cause injury to others. As with criminal punishment, goals of punitive damages include 
retribution, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. Unlike criminal punishment, however, 
some courts allow punitive damages to follow the death of defendants. To explore this issue, we 
first conducted a legal analysis of appellate court decisions concerning punitive damages against 
deceased defendants. While the majority of courts suggest that punitive damages against deceased 
individuals are not appropriate, some argue that favorable policy implications of allowing punitive 
damages to follow the defendant’s death merit their survivability. Next, we conducted a simulation 
study to investigate the effects of defendant injury severity, including death, on juror decisions in 
a punitive damages case. Consistent with some judicial reasoning, mock jurors’ liability and dam-
age awards were not influenced by a defendant’s injury severity, but defendant death did influence 
participants’ self-reported goals of their punitive damage awards. We conclude with a discussion of 
policy and research implications.
Keywords: punitive damages, outcome severity, civil law
Nearly every major world religion believes that individuals can face punishment after their 
deaths. Christian and Islamic denominations believe that humans suffer the consequences 
of earthly sins in Hell (or some variation). Many Buddhists and Hindus believe in an after-
life of temporary suffering for those who commit evil acts during their lifetimes. Another, 
somewhat parallel, religious and cultural belief is that children will pay for “the sins of their 
fathers” (e.g., the Book of Jeremiah [32:18]). In modern times, and outside of religious con-
texts, some have argued that descendants of slave-owners should pay reparations to de-
scendants of slaves, and the post-WWII German government has made numerous repara-
tions to victims of Nazi atrocities and their descendants. Thus, ample evidence exists of the 
popular belief that punishment survives a transgressor’s death; the United States’ legal sys-
tem, however, generally feels otherwise. The present research explores legal policies and as-
sumptions related to punishing deceased defendants in civil contexts.
393
394   Ro b i c h ea ux & bo R n s te i n i n Ps y c hol og y, Pub l i c Pol i c y, a nd la w 16 (2010)
The traditional view in common law is that “the realm of the dead is not invaded, and 
punishment (is not) visited upon the dead” (Mervis v. Wolverton, 1968). The state is un-
able to criminally punish a deceased individual, and prosecution of a criminal defendant 
abates if the defendant passes away during trial. For instance, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court held that continuing a criminal appeal after a defendant’s death would be moot 
(State v. Hoxsie, 1997).
Although punitive damages result from civil transgressions, they share common attri-
butes with criminal sanctions (e.g., the intent to exact retribution and to deter; Bornstein, 
Robicheaux, & Thimsen, 2009; Galanter & Luban, 1993). However, criminal and civil pun-
ishments differ in important ways. These differences are particularly salient in the case of 
severe offenses, which are most likely to elicit relatively harsh punishment (in criminal 
cases, incarceration or execution; in civil cases, punitive damages). Sentencing a deceased 
defendant to incarceration or execution would be absurd, but in civil cases punishment 
against the deceased is still obtainable via punitive damages levied against the defen-
dant’s estate. Thus, punishment of dead defendants is a more viable option in civil, rather 
than in criminal, cases. Such a remedy is also legally permissible in some jurisdictions.
Punitive Damages 
Compensatory damages (i.e., financial awards intended to make injured parties whole) 
are the most common remedy in civil cases in the United States. Compensatory damage 
awards include economic damages (e.g., medical bills, lost work) and noneconomic dam-
ages (e.g., money for pain and suffering) (for a review, see Greene & Bornstein, 2003). In 
addition to compensatory damages, most states also allow some form of punitive or ex-
emplary damages against defendants who act in a reckless, willful, or wanton manner 
(Restatement [Second] of Torts, 1965, §908). Punitive damages serve both to punish a defen-
dant (i.e., they have a retributive function) and to deter the defendant, and others, from 
engaging in similar acts in the future (e.g., Dressler, 2007; Restatement [Second] of Torts, 
1965, §908). While punitive damage awards are often targeted by advocates of tort reform 
(e.g., the American Tort Reform Association; see www.atra.org), jurors award them spar-
ingly (see e.g., Cohen & Smith, 2004; Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, & Wells, 
2002; Ostrom, Rottman, & Goerdt, 1996; Rustad, 1998) and often reserve such awards for 
cases approaching, but not reaching, criminal negligence (Galanter & Luban, 1993). Pu-
nitive damages are most frequently awarded in cases involving intentional misconduct 
or immoral behavior on the part of the defendant, while they are less common in typical 
torts cases (e.g., medical malpractice, products liability, automobile cases) (Eisenberg, Go-
erdt, Ostrom, Rottman, & Wells, 1997).
The punitive damage award “is more about the defendant’s behavior than the plain-
tiff’s loss” (Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 1999). Punitive damages typically 
are not meant to benefit plaintiffs directly but to send a message that the defendant’s be-
havior was unacceptable (Martin, 2003). When calculating punitive damages, courts fo-
cus on elements of the defendant’s conduct (e.g., the recklessness or reprehensibility of 
the behavior), as well as the financial status of the defendant, to determine a suitable 
award (Bornstein et al., 2009; Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Restatement [Second] of Torts, 1965, 
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§908). Recent jurisprudence has also identified the degree of harm to the plaintiff as an 
important consideration when assessing the appropriateness of a punitive damage award 
(BMW v. Gore, 1996; State Farm v. Campbell, 2003).
Primary Goals of Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages provide juries with a means of demonstrating societal disapproval of 
malicious or reckless behaviors through financial punishment (Doe v. Colligan, 1988; Re-
statement [Second] of Torts, 1965). Not only can juries levy punitive damage awards against 
individuals, but they can also award damages against those generally not punishable by 
the criminal court system (e.g., corporations; government agencies). While punitive dam-
ages may serve several purposes, according to many states’ statutes the central purpose 
is punishment (i.e., retribution) (Doe v. Colligan, 1998; Thorpe v. Wilson, 1982; for a review, 
see Bornstein et al., 2009).
In addition to retribution, however, punitive damages also serve a deterrent purpose 
(Dressler, 2007; Restatement [Second] of Torts, 1965). The message of societal disapproval 
sent through punitive damage awards serves as a warning to both the wrongdoer and 
to others who may engage in similar activity. A defendant who engages in reckless and 
dangerous practices is expected to adjust future behavior following a punitive damage 
award, and punitive damage awards against one party also send a message to others who 
are not part of the civil case (e.g., Galanter & Luban, 1993; Sharkey, 2003; G.J.D. by G.J.D. 
v. Johnson, 1998). For instance, a punitive damage award against a corporation engag-
ing in reckless disposal of toxic waste may prompt other corporations to reevaluate their 
waste disposal practices. 1
The civil justice system often treats punitive damages and compensatory damages dif-
ferently. For example, while compensatory damage awards are typically reduced by a 
plaintiff’s share of contributory negligence, punitive damage awards usually are not 
(Clark v. Cantrell, 1998; Schwartz, 1992; Woods & Deere, 1996). While the goal of com-
pensatory damages is to make an injured party whole, the goals of punitive damages are 
analogous with the (perceived) primary goals of criminal sanctions (i.e., retribution and 
deterrence) (see e.g., Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998; Nagin, 1998). In addition, many 
states require a higher burden of proof to demonstrate liability for punitive damages than 
to demonstrate liability for compensatory damages (Robbennolt, 2002). Because of both 
the differential legal treatment of compensatory and punitive damages in the civil jus-
tice system, as well as the similarities between punitive damages and criminal sanctions, 
barring punitive damages to follow the death of a defendant would seem to make legal 
sense.
On the contrary, some evidence demonstrates that decisions involving punitive dam-
ages and compensatory damages are highly interconnected. Though punitive dam-
age awards are intended to be based on the defendant’s conduct, they punitive dam-
age awards often correlate with compensatory damage awards (i.e., awards based on the 
1 Some argue that punitive damages may even over deter certain favorable behaviors (e.g., Breslo, 1992; Priest, 
2002). For instance, after a large punitive award against a pharmaceutical company accused of product liabil-
ity, other pharmaceutical companies may delay the release of potentially helpful drugs.
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plaintiff’s injuries) (see e.g., Eisenberg, Hans, & Wells, 2008; Eisenberg et al., 2002; Vid-
mar et al., 2006). Moreover, two key Supreme Court rulings (i.e., BMW of North America 
v. Gore, 1996; State Farm v. Campbell, 2003) suggest that punitive damage awards should 
be scaled to compensatory damage awards. The Court has held that the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, though not narrowly prescribed, typically should re-
main a single number (i.e., less than 10:1).
Quantifying Punitive Damages
Although the goals of punitive damages vary somewhat across states, most state laws 
concerning punitive damages share common themes of retribution and deterrence. In-
jured parties generally provide evidence of actual damages through medical bills, account 
statements, written estimates (e.g., car repair estimates), and other proof. Thus, a jury can 
utilize objective financial information when determining these damages, but when deter-
mining punitive damages the jury has little (or no) objective guidance for achieving the 
goals of retribution and deterrence.
Generally, jurors are instructed to consider several elements when determining puni-
tive damages against a defendant. For instance, juries finding defendants liable for puni-
tive damages in North Dakota receive the following instructions: 
If you decide to use your discretion to award a reasonable sum as exemplary or pu-
nitive damages, then you must also find by clear and convincing evidence that:
1) the amount awarded bears a reasonable relationship to any harm that is likely to 
result from the Defendant’s conduct and any harm that actually has occurred;
and
2) the amount awarded is consistent with the degree of reprehensibility of the Defen-
dant’s conduct and its duration.
Further, in considering an award of exemplary or punitive damages, you 
must also consider:
1) the extent to which the Defendant was aware of the conduct or concealed it;
2) the extent to which the Defendant profited from the conduct and whether or not 
it would be desirable to remove that profit or have the Defendant also sustain a 
loss;
3) the extent to which the Defendant has already been punished for the same conduct 
by criminal sanctions. (State Bar Association of North Dakota, n.d.).
Other states provide jurors with similar guidance, with common themes of bas-
ing awards on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions, the financial resources of 
the defendant, and the relationship of the award to actual damages (for a review, see 
Dressler, 2007). When translating these goals to dollar amounts, jurors must determine 
how to weigh each element of punitive damages and how to quantify those elements. 
Empirical research demonstrates that jurors consider all of the major elements (repre-
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hensibility, deterrence, and degree of harm) in awarding punitive damages (e.g., Cather, 
Greene, & Durham, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 2008).
Punitive Damages and the Death of a Defendant
Under early English common law, a legal claim did not survive the death of any party 
in a civil case (Polashuk, 2003). However, under the modern civil justice system in the 
United States, certain claims do survive the death of a litigant (Polashuk, 2003). Per-
haps the most salient example of a modern exception to the early common law rule is 
the wrongful death claim. Personal representatives of the deceased can file a wrongful 
death claim against a defendant whose negligent or intentional actions allegedly led to 
the death of another.
Many states have enacted survival statutes (i.e., laws dictating that certain tort ac-
tions survive the death of either or both parties to a case) (for a review, see Polashuk, 
2003). These laws provide personal representatives of a deceased plaintiff with the same 
rights of action as the deceased individual had the death not occurred. A plaintiff may 
also seek damages against the representatives of a deceased defendant under such laws. 
The Florida survival statute contains wording typical of most state survival statutes 
(2008 Florida Statutes §46–021): “No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of 
action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted, and defended in the name of the 
person prescribed by the law.”
The types of claims that survive litigants’ deaths are often limited by statute or case-
law. Some states’ survival statutes, such as Florida’s, are broadly worded (i.e., they 
do not contain explicit exceptions of tort claims that do not survive a litigant’ death), 
while other states’ statutes specify exceptions. For example, claims for specific inten-
tional torts, such as slander, libel, and defamation, abate after a litigant’s death in some 
states (e.g., Kansas Statutes, §60–1802; Oklahoma Statutes, §12–1502). Thus, while many 
claims do survive the death of parties, this survivability is not without limits.
Few states have explicit legislation allowing or barring a plaintiff from receiving pu-
nitive damages from a deceased defendant. One exception, Georgia, permits tort claims 
against a deceased defendant through its survival statute, but it explicitly prohibits pu-
nitive damages following the defendant’s death (Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
§9–2–41). In addition, the survival statute of Idaho bars damages for libel, slander, and 
any punitive or exemplary damages after the death of a wrongdoer (Idaho Code, §5–327). 
On the contrary, Texas (Texas Statutes, §71.008 and §71.009 [for wrongful death claims 
only]) and Oklahoma (Oklahoma Statutes, §12–1053) explicitly allow plaintiffs to seek 
punitive damages against a deceased defendant’s estate. Most state codes do not di-
rectly specify whether punitive damages survive the death of either litigant, suggesting 
that opportunities for punitive damages against deceased defendants might be avail-
able in a relatively large number of jurisdictions. The issue is important because when 
defendants behave in a manner reckless and reprehensible enough to warrant punitive 
damages, they are likely to cause serious harm (and even death) to others besides plain-
tiffs, including themselves.
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The Law Concerning Punitive Damages and Defendant Death
The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is one authority stating that punitive damages 
should not follow the death of a wrongdoer, and the majority of courts considering the 
issue have provided rulings consistent with this position. In those states where punitive 
damages against a deceased defendant are explicitly allowed, or barred, by statute, ap-
peals courts are reluctant to reach decisions contrary to the statutory language (see, e.g., 
Gordon v. Nathan, 1974). Other courts have interpreted specific wording in survival stat-
utes as allowing punitive damages to follow a defendant’s death. As few survival stat-
utes address the issue specifically, the law in most jurisdictions is derived from decisions 
in which judges invoke various policy arguments when holding that punitive damages 
against deceased defendants either are or are not allowed (see Study 1).
Determining Damages When the Defendant is Deceased
Several courts have suggested that the jury may consider the defendant’s death when 
determining the award, but they provide little guidance on how the defendant’s death 
should influence the awards (e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 1977, G.J.D. by G.J.D. v. Johnson, 1998; Ha-
ralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001; Tillett v. Lippert, 1996). Jurors would be aware that 
any punitive award would go against the estate (G.J.D. by G.J.D. v. Johnson, 1998). They 
would be expected to balance the costs to the heirs against the benefits of general deter-
rence (Schwab v. Bates, 1991) and to consider “all aspects of fairness and justice in decid-
ing whether, and in what amount, to award punitive damages” (Haralson v. Fisher Sur-
veying, Inc., p. 119). In only one decision (i.e., Tillettt v. Lippert, 1996) did the court suggest 
that the trier of fact should compartmentalize the various roles of punitive damages and 
determine an award adequate only to set an example to others. No court suggests or cites 
specific jury instructions related to punitive damages and defendant death, however.
The Current Studies
We examine the issue of punitive damages and defendant death using an analysis of rel-
evant appellate court decisions, as well as a simulation study to investigate mock juror 
decision making in defendant death cases. Utilizing multiple methodologies and explor-
ing the issue in both an ecologically valid setting (i.e., actual cases) and in a situation with 
high internal validity (i.e., a simulation study) lends greater confidence to the conclusions 
we can draw from the results (see, e.g., Vidmar, 2008).
Study 1: Analysis of Appellate Court Decisions 
Case Selection and Coding
For the current analysis, we examined appellate court decisions involving punitive dam-
ages against deceased defendants that have been argued since 1960 (i.e., the last 50 years). 
We chose to examine appellate court decisions because they are consistently published 
and contain information from a large number of jurisdictions, including both state and 
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federal courts. Appellate decisions also tend to provide ample information about judicial 
interpretation of the law, as well as policy arguments undergirding the decision, which 
was the focus of the current analysis. However, because the grounds for appeals typically 
are based on a small number of specific facts or points of law, appellate decisions may 
lack detailed information about a case. In addition, appellate cases are not selected ran-
domly and thus may not represent typical legal decisions. Despite these limitations, be-
cause our primary goal was to explore the rationale of the courts deciding these cases (i.e., 
the interpretation of the law), appellate cases are the most appropriate source of data for 
the current analysis.
We began our search for relevant cases by selecting all cases cited in the American Law 
Report’s (ALR) section dedicated to punitive damages and survival statutes (Zitter, 1984). 
We selected only those cases that involved a deceased defendant (or deceased representa-
tive of a business entity). We did not select cases involving a deceased plaintiff unless the 
defendant also was deceased. We followed all cases cited by the ALR forwards and back-
wards (i.e., by locating earlier cases cited in a particular decision as well as later cases that 
cited each particular decision). Finally, we conducted a Westlaw search for any additional 
and more recent cases and followed these cases forwards and backwards, as well. For 
each case, we discuss only the decision made by the highest court that heard the case. Our 
complete database included 49 court decisions (see Table 1) involving punitive damages 
against deceased defendants. 2 
We coded each case on several parameters. The criterion variable was the court’s 
holding concerning punitive damages following the defendant’s death (i.e., allowed or 
barred). We investigated multiple predictor variables, including the jurisdiction, and the 
level of appeal. We coded cases by type of claim (i.e., libel/slander; automobile injury; 
fraud; landlord/tenant; intentional infliction of emotional distress; assault/sexual as-
sault; trespass; false imprisonment; malpractice). We also examined other variables, such 
as the cause of defendant death (i.e., as a result of his or her own behavior or because of 
some unrelated cause), whether the plaintiff was alive at the time of trial, and any dam-
age awards levied against the defendant (where applicable). Concerning how the defen-
dant died, some deaths occurred while engaging in the behavior that was the subject of 
the lawsuit (e.g., died while driving under the influence of alcohol), while others died 
from causes unrelated to the reckless or wanton behavior (e.g., a plane crash after the suit 
was followed). Finally, we explored the courts’ legal rationale for their decisions. Specif-
ically, we examined whether courts based their decisions on statutory language (i.e., in 
the punitive damages statutes and the survival statutes), public policy arguments, or stare 
decisis.
Results
Our statistical analyses involve several predictor variables of the decision to allow or to 
not allow punitive damages to follow the defendant’s death. Where coding permits, we 
2. In Sanchez v. Marquez (1978), a Colorado court refused to allow punitive damages against deceased plaintiff as 
part of the defendant’s countersuit.
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Table 1. Decisions Utilized in Study 2 by State, Court Level (i.e., Federal or State Appellate Court), 
Type of Case (e.g., Fraud, Automobile Negligence), and Decision (i.e., To Allow or Not Allow Pu-
nitive Damages to Follow a Defendant’s Death)Decisions Utilized in Study 2 by State, Court Level 
(i.e., Federal or State Appellate Court), Type of Case (e.g., Fraud, Automobile Negligence), and De-
cision (i.e., To Allow or Not Allow Punitive Damages to Follow a Defendant’s Death)
State, Case (year)  Court level  Case type  Decision
Alabama
    Ellis v. Zuck (1977)  Federal  Fraud  Allowed
Alaska
    Doe v. Colligan (1988)  State  Sexual abuse  Not allowed
Arizona
    Braun v. Moreno (1970)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc.
        (2001)  State  Automobile  Allowed
California
    Holm Timber v. Plywood Corp.
        (1966)  State  Trespass  Not allowed
Colorado
    Sanchez v. Marquez (1978)   Assault  Not alloweda
District of Columbia
    Woodner v. Breeden (1995)  State/district  Landlord  Not allowed
Florida
    Johnson v. Rinesmith (1970)  Automobile  Allowed
    Stephens v. Rohde (1985)  State  Automobile  Allowed
    Byrd v. Lohr (1986)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
Hawaii
    Kaopuki v. Kealoha (2003)  State  Automobile  Allowed
Illinois
    Stafford v. Purofied Down
        Products (1992)  Federal  Automobile  Not allowed
    Penberthy v. Price (1996)  State  Illegal firing  Allowed
Indiana
    Crabtree v. Crabtree (2005)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
Iowa
    Rowen v. Le Mars Mut, Ins. Co.
(1979)  State  Fraudb  Not allowed
    Wolder v. Rahm (1977)  State  Malpractice  Not allowed
Kansas
    Elam v. Williams (1990)  Federal  Illegal firing  Not allowed
    Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush
        (1991)  Federal  Malpractice  Not allowed
Kentucky
    Stewart v. Estate of Cooper
        (2003)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
Minnesota
    Thompson v. Petroff’s Estate
        (1982)  State  Sexual assault  Not allowed
Mississippi
    Mervis v. Wolverton (1968)  State  Not allowed
Missouri
    Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill
        (1965)  Federal  Fraudb  Not allowed
    Tietjens v. General Motors (1967)  State  Fraudb  Not allowed
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Table 1.  (continued)
State, Case (year)  Court level  Case type  Decision
Montana
    Tillett v. Lippert (1996)  State  Assault  Allowed
Nevada
    Allen v. Anderson (1977)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Summa Corp. v. Greenspun
        (1980)  State  Slanderb  Not allowed
New Hampshire
    Munson v. Raudonis (1978)  State  Fraud  Allowed
New Mexico
    Barnes v. Smith (1962)  Federal  Automobile  Not allowed
    State Farm v. Maidment (1988)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Jaramillo v. Providence Wash,
        Ins. (1994)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
New York
    Faulk v. Aware, Inc. (1963)  State  Libel  Not allowed
    Gordon v. Nathan (1974)  State  Landlord  Not allowed
North Carolina
    McAdams v. Blue (1968)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Thorpe v. Wilson (1982)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Harrell v. Bowen (2006)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
Oregon
    Ashcraft v. Saunders (1968)  State  Trespass  Not allowed
    Pearson v. Galvin (1969)  State  Imprisonment  Not allowed
Pennsylvania
    G.J.D. by G.J.D. v. Johnson
        (1998)  State  IIEDc  Allowed
    Schwab v. Bates (1991)  State  Automobile  Allowed
    Morfesi v. Sherman (1991)  State  Malpractice  Not allowed
South Carolina
    In re Thomas (1999)  Federal  IIED  Allowed
South Dakota
    Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin (2002)  State  Other  Not allowed
Tennessee
    Hayes v. Gill (1965)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Paul v. Milburn (1967)  Federal  Automobile  Not allowed
Texas
    Hoefer v. Lavender (1984)  State  Automobile  Allowed
Virginia
    Dalton v. Johnson (1963)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
    Tarbrake v. Sharp (1995)  Federal  Automobile  Not allowed
West Virginia
    Perry v. Melton (1982)  State  Automobile  Allowed
Wyoming
    Parker v. Artery (1995)  State  Automobile  Not allowed
a. Deceased litigant was the plaintiff; defendant filed countersuit. 
b. The deceased parties in these cases were representatives of the company. 
c. Intentional infliction of emotional distress.
402   Ro b i c h ea ux & bo R n s te i n i n Ps y c hol og y, Pub l i c Pol i c y, a nd la w 16 (2010)
utilize logistic regression or chi-square analyses to predict the courts’ decisions. We con-
clude this section with an analysis of the rationale behind decisions. When describing the 
rationale, we provide qualitative descriptions of the courts’ arguments but conduct no 
statistical analyses. Instead, we explore issues such as public policy arguments, legislative 
intent, and interpretations of survivor statutes. We also highlight several cases in which 
the courts used the same rationale (e.g., the absence of specific language in a survival stat-
ute) to reach conflicting decisions.
General Findings
Across all cases, the majority of courts (n = 37; 74%) did not allow punitive damages against 
the deceased defendant. One case was complicated by extraneous factors, however. A Cal-
ifornia court allowed punitive damages to survive the defendant’s death in Whelan v. Rallo 
(1997), but this was because the defendant passed away between the trial court’s initial de-
cision and appeal (i.e., punitive damages were levied before the defendant’s death). Ac-
cording to the court, had the defendant died before the initial trial, punitive damages would 
not have been permitted. This case was excluded from our subsequent analyses.
Decision by State
Courts in 31 jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, decided these cases (see 
Table 1). In seven states, allowing punitive damages against a deceased defendant was 
deemed permissible, while they are not permissible in 27 states. In addition, courts in 
four states (Pennsylvania, Florida, Arizona, and Illinois) formed contradictory decisions 
across cases intra-state. For instance, the most recent decision in Arizona was to allow pu-
nitive damages to follow the defendant’s death (Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001), 
which overturned an earlier decision (Braun v. Moreno, 1970). In Pennsylvania, the Com-
mon Court of Appeals issued decisions both allowing punitive damages to follow the de-
fendant’s death and barring it; these decisions were both made in the same year (i.e., Mor-
fesi v. Sherman, 1991; Schwab v. Bates, 1991). In Florida, two decisions held that punitive 
damages could follow the death of a defendant (Johnson v. Rinesmith, 1970; Stephens v. Ro-
hde, 1985), but according to the most recent decision punitive damages do not follow the 
defendant’s death (Byrd v. Lohr, 1986).
Decisions by Case Type
We classified cases into three general civil categories: intentional torts, automobile ac-
cidents, and other types of cases (e.g., medical malpractice, trespass, wrongful termina-
tion). Twenty-four (50%) of the cases involved automobile accidents; many of these in-
volved intoxicated drivers. Further, 17 (35.4%) of the cases involved intentional torts (e.g., 
libel, assault, sexual assault). The remaining cases (14.6%) fell into some other category. 
The percentage of tort claims and percentage of cases involving automobile accidents are 
especially notable, considering punitive damages in automobile accidents overall are rel-
atively rare (Eisenberg et al., 1997, 2002). Punitive damages survived the death of the de-
fendant in 33.3% of the automobile cases, in 29.4% of the intentional tort cases, and in 
none of the other cases. This pattern was not statistically significant, χ2(2) = 3.12, p = .21.
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Cause of Death
We were able to discern the cause of the defendant’s death in 46 of the cases. We classi-
fied the defendant’s death as either caused by the reckless act, unrelated to the act, or be-
cause of suicide. Suicide was the cause of the defendant’s death in two of the cases (Doe 
v. Colligan, 1998; G.J.D. by G.J.D. v. Johnson, 1998). The defendant’s act caused his or her 
death in 18 (39.1%) of the cases, while the defendant died of unrelated causes before trial 
in the remaining 26 (56.5%) of the cases. Most cases (n = 16) in which the defendant’s act 
caused his or her death involved automobile accidents.
There was no significant relationship between the cause of the defendant’s death and 
the decision to allow punitive damages, χ2(1) = 0.56, p = .46. The court allowed punitive 
damages in six (33%) of the cases in which the defendant’s actions led to his or her death 
and in six (22%) of the cases in which the defendant died of unrelated causes. When the 
defendant committed suicide, the courts were split on their decisions to allow punitive 
damages against the deceased defendant, with one allowing the claim to survive and one 
ruling against survival.
Damage Awards
Although juries awarded punitive damages in several of the cases before the cases were 
heard on appeal, these award amounts were seldom reported in the decisions. We were 
able to determine the initial punitive damage awards in 11 of the cases, and we adjusted 
these values to today’s dollars using the consumer price index. The relative values of 
these awards ranged from $5,850 to $828,885 (m = $138,388; median = $61,869). The ra-
tio of punitive damages to compensatory damages ranged from 0.04:1 to 3.64:1 (m = 0.8:1, 
median = 0.42:1).
Decision Rationale
In many cases, the judges focused on multiple points (e.g., the survival statute, the pur-
pose of punitive damages). In this section, we summarize the general topics of discus-
sion in the decisions. We organize this section by the courts’ rationales (e.g., public policy, 
statutory interpretation) because some courts arrived at disparate decisions utilizing the 
same rationale.
Several of the courts based their decisions on stare decisis. In these cases, consideration 
of punitive damages against the deceased defendant was typically only a minor issue, 
among several other issues, in the appeal. Few courts gave much attention to the issue in 
those cases when they relied on state precedent. For instance, the Iowa Supreme Court 
(Dalton v. Johnson, 1963) wrote a single sentence relevant to this issue when they held that 
punitive damages do not follow the defendant’s death. However, courts did not always 
follow state precedent (e.g., Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001).
Most of the courts cited the states’ survival statutes in their written decisions. When 
survival statutes were silent regarding punitive damages following the death of a defen-
dant, courts came to differing conclusions. One policy argument against allowing puni-
tive damages to follow a defendant’s death is that the court would be involved in making 
law (i.e., doing the job of the legislature). According to this argument, if lawmakers in-
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tended to allow punitive damages against deceased defendants, they would have written 
the survival statute to reflect that (Doe v. Colligan, 1988). Although a statute may not bar 
punitive damages against a deceased defendant, interpreting this silence as an endorse-
ment would be akin to creating a new cause of action where one did not previously exist 
(Tarbrake v. Sharp, 1995).
The cases analyzed in Study 1 demonstrate different interpretations of statutory si-
lence. For instance, the New Hampshire survival statute does not explicitly mention pu-
nitive damages, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court allowed punitive damages to 
follow the defendant’s death because punitive damages are considered “liberal compen-
sating damages” in the state (Munson v. Raudonis, 1978). Similarly, in Ellis v. Zuck (1977), 
the court held that punitive damages could follow the death of the defendant because the 
survival statute did not explicitly restrict them. The court reasoned that if wrongful death 
claims could follow the death of a defendant, then so could punitive damages claims be-
cause in Alabama all damages one can recover under wrongful death claims are consid-
ered punitive damages. In contrast to these rulings, the court in Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. 
Estate of Crabtree (2005, p. 137) argued that the absence of language concerning punitive 
damages in the Indiana survival statutes “can be viewed as an implicit rejection of puni-
tive damages [surviving a defendant’s death].”
Several courts emphasized the punitive (i.e., retributive) intent of punitive damages, 
arguing that a defendant’s death nullified the primary public policy purpose of punitive 
damages. This purpose cannot be served if a defendant is deceased, and when “the rea-
son for a rule ceases to exist, the rule itself is no longer of value and is extinguished by the 
disappearance of reason” (Hayes v. Gill, 1965, p. 217). Retribution is the primary purposes 
of punitive damages in most states, and courts recognize the futility of seeking monetary 
retribution against someone who is already deceased (e.g., “a dead wrongdoer is far be-
yond our temporal power to penalize” [Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 2002]) (see also Thompson v. 
Petroff’s Estate, 1982 [allowing punitive damages against the dead would ignore the entire 
purpose of punitive damages]; Thorpe v. Wilson, 1982 [sole purpose of punitive damages 
is retribution against the wrongdoer]).
A number of courts also considered the general deterrent role of punitive damages. 
Many of the courts agreed that punitive damages levied against a wrongdoer can deter 
others from engaging in future reckless acts (e.g., Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001; 
Byrd v. Lohr, 1986). The area of disagreement, however, concerned whether retribution 
is necessary to accomplish the goal of general deterrence. For instance, in Byrd v. Lohr 
(1986), the court agreed that punitive damages levied against a defendant who was driv-
ing while intoxicated would serve as an example to others but only if the punitive dam-
ages could also serve a retributive role (i.e., if the defendant lived).
The Supreme Court of Alaska reached a similar conclusion when deciding Doe v. Colli-
gan (1988). The defendant, who worked for a service organization, was accused of sexually 
abusing a child. Before the case went to trial, he committed suicide, and the family sought 
punitive damages from his estate. The court held that the state’s survival statute, liberally 
construed, would allow punitive damages against a deceased defendant, but that deter-
rence depends on punishment. The court held that the general deterrent role of punitive 
damages was “speculative at best,” thus punitive damages should not follow the death of 
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a defendant (Doe v. Colligan, 1988). Not only did the court in the Colligan case reject the de-
terrent value of punitive damages if levied against a deceased defendant, but it also dem-
onstrated reluctance to accept the deterrent value of such damages in the first place.
However, other courts held that the general deterrent role of punitive damages is a 
sufficient reason to allow them to follow a defendant’s death. The Hawaiian high court, in 
Kaopuki v. Kealoha (2003), argued that allowing punitive damages to follow the death of a 
drunk driver would send a message to others who may be tempted to engage drive under 
the influence. The Supreme Court of Arizona followed a similar rationale when deciding 
Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc. (2001). The defendant was driving under the influence of 
various drugs when he collided with the plaintiff. The decision stated that the court rec-
ognized that the defendant was beyond punishment and that his fate was a “far more se-
rious penalty than any court or jury could mete out” (Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 
2001, p. 117). Nevertheless, the court held that allowing punitive damages against the es-
tate still served as an example to others in the state.
While some have questioned the public policy implications of forcing heirs to pay a 
defendant’s punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Arizona emphasized that jurors 
could consider the financial hardships that punitive damages may cause the defendant’s 
heirs (Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001). They illustrated this point by arguing that if 
the defendant survived an accident but fell into a coma, the plaintiff could seek punitive 
damages. They questioned how the hardship on the defendant’s representatives would 
differ in such a situation from if the defendant were deceased.
At least one court (Byrd v. Lohr, 1986) reasoned that allowing punitive damages against 
a deceased defendant could actually lead some tortfeasors to be more likely to engage in 
risky behaviors because individuals would be able to diffuse their financial responsibil-
ities for reckless behaviors to others. On the contrary, another court (Kaopuki v. Kealoha, 
2003) argued that allowing the punitive damages to follow a defendant’s death would ac-
tually buttress the deterrent role of punitive damages. According to the Kaopuki court, in-
dividuals may avoid engaging in a reckless activity (e.g., drunk driving) if they realize 
that it may cost their heirs.
Study 2: A Jury Simulation 
As the review of appellate decisions illustrates, courts consider the various purposes 
of punitive damages in deciding whether to allow them against deceased defendants, 
but they are inconsistent in doing so, especially with regard to general versus specific 
deterrence. Mock jury research suggests that jurors also consider the various purposes 
of punitive damages when making judgments. They seek both retribution and deter-
rence in awarding punitive damages, and they weigh these intentions roughly equally 
(e.g., Greene, Coon, & Bornstein, 2001; Greene, Johns, & Smith, 2001). The studies have 
not distinguished between specific and general deterrence, but they do demonstrate that 
mock jurors are sensitive to relevant defendant characteristics, such as defendant conduct 
(Greene, Johns, & Smith, 2001). Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that they would be sensi-
tive to other features, such as whether the defendant is alive or dead, which arguably per-
406   Ro b i c h ea ux & bo R n s te i n i n Ps y c hol og y, Pub l i c Pol i c y, a nd la w 16 (2010)
tains more to some purposes of punitive damages (i.e., retribution, specific deterrence) 
than others (i.e., general deterrence). Studying mock jurors also provides an opportunity 
to compare lay perceptions of awarding punitive damages against deceased defendants 
to legal assumptions about the issue, as explored in Study 1.
Although the majority of courts do not allow punitive damage awards against de-
ceased defendants, juries have found deceased defendants liable for punitive damages in 
a number of cases (e.g., Braun v. Moreno, 1970; Ellis v. Zuck, 1977; Tillett v. Lippert, 1996). 
We employed a simulation study to examine the effects of the severity of a defendant’s 
injuries, including fatal injuries, on mock jurors’ punitive damages decisions. The sever-
ities of outcomes (e.g., injury severity, property damage), generally, predict mock jurors’ 
decisions to punish others (Robbennolt, 2000). However, such findings concern property 
damage or injuries suffered by plaintiffs or crime victims and not injuries suffered by the 
wrongdoers themselves.
When defendants are found liable for punitive damages, the jury must also determine 
an appropriate punitive damage award. More severely injured civil plaintiffs often re-
ceive higher punitive damages awards than less injured plaintiffs (e.g., Bornstein, 1998; 
for exceptions see Cather et al., 1996; for a general review see Robbennolt, 2000). No prior 
research, however, has involved a manipulation of a defendant’s injury severity.
In addition to studying the effects of a defendant’s injury severity on punitive liabil-
ity and damage award decisions, we also examined other possible predictors of these de-
cisions (e.g., the perceived recklessness of a defendant’s behavior). Finally, we examined 
how a defendant’s death influenced individuals’ self-reported reasons for awarding pu-
nitive damages. We hypothesized that when a defendant was deceased, jurors would 
award less in punitive damages and would report being less motivated by goals of retri-
bution and specific deterrence than if the defendant survived.
Method
Participants. Participants included 128 individuals acting as mock jurors; participants 
received research credit in undergraduate psychology courses in exchange for their par-
ticipation. The majority of participants were female (71%) and most were White (83%). 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 48 years (m = 20.2 years).
Design and procedure. Mock jurors were assigned to one of three defendant injury se-
verity conditions (i.e., low injury severity, high injury severity, and defendant death). Ac-
cording to a written summary of a civil trial, the defendant suffered fatal injuries, minor 
injuries (e.g., bruising, a cut on the head), or severe injures (e.g., a broken back, partial 
paralysis). The written trial summary, based on Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc. (2001), 
described a truck driver who owned and operated a seafood shopping company. Wit-
nesses testified that the truck driver caused an accident when he crossed the centerline 
and drove into oncoming traffic before colliding with the plaintiff.
The truck driver had consumed a substantial amount of caffeine supplements before 
driving to make a nighttime delivery. A witnessed testified that the driver was really tired 
before leaving, but he choose to drive anyway because he had an opportunity to make a 
big sale (i.e., his behavior was motivated by profit). The witness, a former employee, testi-
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fied that the defendant seemed almost incoherent and “buzzed” before driving away, and 
he insisted on driving despite protests by the employee.
Though the deceased in the original case was under the influence of drugs and alco-
hol, we chose to introduce evidence about caffeine supplementation to avoid introducing 
a strong criminal element into the case. The concern was that having the defendant drive 
under the influence of illegal substances could lead to a ceiling effect (i.e., nearly 100% of 
jurors finding punitive liability). While the defendant’s act was not inherently illegal, an 
expert witness testified that driving while tired and under the influence of caffeine sup-
plement was an extremely risky behavior associated with many accidents. Further, the 
evidence from the employee indicated that the defendant’s behavior was inherently reck-
less. The recklessness of the defendant, as well as the profit motivation, led to punitive 
damages being a potentially appropriate remedy.
After reading the trial summary, participants were directed to jury instructions. The 
instructions were derived from Oklahoma’s pattern jury instructions. The first portion of 
the instructions described issues the participants should consider when evaluating the 
defendant’s liability for the accident (e.g., a breach of a legal duty, etc.). Those who found 
the defendant liable for compensatory damages then read instructions concerning the 
assignment of said damages (e.g., the plaintiff’s medical bills, pain and suffering, etc.). 
The second portion of the instructions concerned factors the participants should consider 
when determining punitive liability (e.g., recklessness of the defendant’s behavior; profit 
motivation) and damages (e.g., need for punishment; general deterrence; the defendant’s 
wealth). Only those mock jurors who found the defendant liable for compensatory dam-
ages determined punitive liability; only those who found the defendant liable for puni-
tive damage awarded these damages. The instructions did not mention the defendant’s 
death; participants received the same instructions across conditions. Thus, nothing in the 
instructions would make the issue of the defendant’s death salient when the participants 
awarded damages. However, the instructions were general enough that they applied to 
all three conditions.
We measured participants’ reported sympathy for the litigants with three related ques-
tions (adapted from Haegrich & Bottoms, 2000). Each participant rated the level of agree-
ment with three statements (i.e., “I feel sorry for the [plaintiff/defendant],” “I feel pity for 
the [plaintiff/defendant],” and “I feel sympathy for the [plaintiff/defendant]”). All par-
ticipants reported their sympathy for the plaintiff first, then for the defendant. Partici-
pants also responded to several items concerning the behaviors of the parties (e.g., the 
dangerousness of the defendant’s behavior; the likelihood that the defendant was moti-
vated by profit; the likelihood that the plaintiff was partially to blame for the accident). 
In addition, participants rated the perceived severity of each party’s injury, as well as re-
ported if each party survived the accident. These questions acted both as manipulation 
checks and as potential predictors of mock juror decisions. Those participants who found 
the defendant liable for punitive damages rated their intentions in awarding punitive 
damages (i.e., retribution, specific deterrence, and general deterrence) on a 10-point scale 
(higher numbers representing a stronger intention). Finally, participants provided stan-
dard demographic information.
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Results
Damage awards are commonly positively skewed, which was the case with these data 
for both compensatory damages and for punitive damages. We normalized values by 
transforming all awards less than the 5th percentile value to that value, and all awards 
greater than the 95th percentile value to that value (see e.g., Hart, Evans, Wissler, Feehan, 
& Saks, 1997). We chose the truncated awards, as opposed to other normalization proce-
dures (e.g., log transformations), to allow the same values (i.e., adjusted dollar awards) 
to be employed for both the inferential statistics and for calculating descriptive statistics. 
For each analysis, comparisons across manipulated were conducted across all three injury 
conditions, as well as across the defendant death and defendant survival conditions (i.e., 
collapsing the minor and severe injury conditions). We refer to these as separate condi-
tions and collapsed conditions, respectively.
Manipulation Checks
All participants in the low injury severity and the high injury severity conditions correctly 
reported that defendant survived the automobile accident. One participant in the defen-
dant death condition incorrectly reported that the defendant survived the accident, while 
the remaining participants correctly reported that he did not survive. The incorrect partic-
ipant’s data were excluded from the analyses.
In addition to the question of defendant death, we also considered participants’ rating 
of the severity of the defendant’s injuries (1 = least severe; 10 = most severe) using a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Participants rated the defendant’s injuries as increas-
ingly more severe across injury manipulation conditions (low injury severity, m = 1.93; 
high injury severity, m = 6.05; defendant death, m = 9.74), F(2, 116) = 144.91, p < .001, r = 
.85, lsd mmd = 1.06. Ratings of sympathy for the defendant also varied across conditions in 
a similar fashion.
Compensatory liability and damages. Concerning compensatory liability, the facts 
supported a liability decision in the plaintiff’s favor (e.g., the defendant crossed the center 
line, an officer testified that the defendant was at fault, etc.). As anticipated, most (86%) of 
the participants found the defendant liable for compensatory damages, and these liability 
decisions did not vary across experimental conditions, χ2(1) = 0.85, p = .65 (separate con-
ditions) and χ2(1) = 0.45, p = .50 (collapsed conditions). The plaintiff’s injuries were held 
constant across defendant conditions. Compensatory damage awards, legally based on 
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, appropriately did not vary across defendant injury 
conditions, F(2, 113) = 0.78, p = .46, r = 0.12 (separate conditions) and F = 1.14, p = .29 (col-
lapsed conditions).
Punitive liability and damages. Figures 1 and 2 depict the descriptive statistics re-
lated to mock jurors’ decisions concerning punitive liability and damages decisions. Of 
the 109 participants who found the defendant liable for compensatory damages, 60.9% 
found the defendant liable for punitive damages. Liability decisions did not significantly 
vary across defendant injury severity conditions, χ2(2) = 1.35, p = .51 (separate conditions) 
and χ2(1) = 0.54, p = .46 (collapsed conditions). Despite the apparent trends in the descrip-
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tive data (see Figure 2), defendant injury severity did not significantly influence punitive 
damage awards, F(2, 68) = 1.03, p = .36, r = .17 (separate conditions) and F(1, 68) = 0.33, p 
= .57 (collapsed data). 
Next, we conducted a binary logistic regression analysis to determine which factors, if 
any, predicted punitive damage liability decisions. Our model included several predic-
tors: (a) ratings of each litigant’s injury severity; (b) participants’ sympathy for each lit-
igant; (c) the perceived seriousness of the defendant’s actions; (d) the perceived danger-
ousness of the defendant’s actions; and (e) the degree to which participants felt that the 
defendant’s actions were motivated by profit.
The full model significantly predicted liability decisions (χ2(7) = 33.94, p < 0.001); report-
ing of individual predictors assume that other predictors were held constant. Perceptions 
of the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries significantly predicted liability such that higher rat-
Figure 1. Percent of participants finding the defendant liable for punitive 
damages across injury severity conditions. 
Figure 2. Mean punitive damage awards across injury severity conditions.
410   Ro b i c h ea ux & bo R n s te i n i n Ps y c hol og y, Pub l i c Pol i c y, a nd la w 16 (2010)
ings of plaintiff injury severity were associated with a higher likelihood of finding the de-
fendant liable (B = .50, p = .006). Perceptions of the severity of the defendant’s injuries failed 
to significantly predict liability decisions, though the predictive value did approach signif-
icance (B = .11, p = .064). The trend was such that those who perceived the defendant’s in-
juries as more serious were more likely to find the defendant liable for punitive damages. 
Sympathy for the defendant was also a significant predictor of liability decisions; higher 
defendant sympathy was associated with a lower likelihood of liability (B = −.13, p = .038). 
Finally, perceived seriousness of the defendant’s actions was a significant predictor of li-
ability decisions (i.e., higher seriousness was associated with a higher likelihood of find-
ing the defendant liable) (B = 0.36, p = .033). Sympathy for the plaintiff (B = −0.002, p = .98), 
perceptions of the dangerousness of the defendant’s actions (B = 0.112, p = .41), and per-
ceptions of profit motivation (B = <0.001; p > .99) failed to predict liability decisions.
Goals of damage awards
Next, we investigated mock jurors’ self-reported goals (i.e., punishment, specific de-
terrence, and general deterrence) when awarding punitive damages. A punitive dam-
age award can only serve a retributive role and specifically deter a surviving defendant. 
However, the damage award potentially could have a general deterrent effect regardless 
of the defendant’s injuries. We also explored whether mock jurors would report a lower 
intent to punish a defendant who suffered a severe or fatal injury. We conducted a 3 (de-
fendant injury severity level) × 3 (reason for damage award) mixed-groups ANOVA to 
consider group differences in ratings of participants’ intention to punish the defendant, to 
deter the defendant, and to deter others. F(2, 130) = 4.52, p = .013, r = .25. The main effect 
was such that participants intended to deter others more than they intended to punish the 
defendant intention to deter the defendant was intermediate (m = 7.17) and did not dif-
fer from either of the other goals (lsd mmd = 0.48). A similar main effect was evident in the 
collapsed condition, F(2, 132) = 9.06, p < 0.01.
This main effect was qualified by a defendant status by goal interaction, F(4, 130) = 
2.52, p = .045, r = .27 (separate conditions) and F(2, 132) = 5.08, p = .007 (collapsed condi-
tions). Those in the survival conditions (i.e., minor and severe injuries) reported a higher 
intention to punish and to deter the defendant than those in the defendant death condi-
tion (see Figure 3). Alternatively, when considering the differences between intentions 
within conditions, the interaction demonstrates no difference in participants’ intentions 
for retribution, specific deterrence, and general deterrence when the defendant suffered 
minor or serious injuries. However, those ratings did differ within the defendant death 
condition; specifically, participants reported a higher intention of general deterrence than 
for retribution or for specific deterrence. 
General Discussion 
We examined the legal issue of punitive damages against deceased defendants utilizing 
both an analysis of appellate cases (Study 1) and a simulation study (Study 2). The major-
ity of jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages to follow the death of a defendant ei-
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ther because of statute or case law, but punitive damages against deceased defendants are 
allowed in some jurisdictions. In addition to the relevance of the issue on its face (i.e., dif-
ferent jurisdictions using similarly worded statutes to arrive at different decisions), both 
studies also illustrate important issues concerning punitive damages in general, such as 
lay intentions, juror understanding, and legal assumptions.
Legal Judgments and Decisions
In actual trials where plaintiffs are seeking punitive damages against a deceased defen-
dant, the defendant’s heirs may accept a finding of liability without protest, or the de-
ceased defendant may be found not liable for punitive damages (i.e., the punitive dam-
ages claim would not be an issue in an appeal). Further, some juries never get to make 
the decision in the first place because the trial judge forbids the plaintiff to seek punitive 
damages against the deceased defendant (e.g., Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 1991; John-
son v. Rinsemith, 1970; Parker v. Artery, 1995; Paul v. Wilburn, 1967). Thus, it is difficult 
to estimate the frequency of punitive damage claims filed against deceased defendants 
and even more difficult to estimate plaintiff win-rates in such cases. However, Study 1 il-
lustrates that juries have awarded punitive damages against deceased defendants when 
given the option (e.g., Braun v. Moreno, 1970; Ellis v. Zuck, 1977; G.J.D. by G.J.D. v. Johnson, 
1998; Hoefer v. Lavender, 1984; Mervis v. Wolverton, 1968; Woodner v. Breeden, 1995). In ad-
dition, over half (~56%) of participants in the defendant death condition of Study 2 found 
the defendant liable for punitive damages. These findings suggest that jurors are willing 
to award punitive damages against deceased defendants under some circumstances.
Eisenberg and colleagues (2002) analyzed 1996 civil court data from a random sam-
ple of state courts in 45 of the largest 75 counties in the United States. These data included 
6,429 jury trials; juries awarded punitive damages in 121 of the trials. Despite the limited 
data concerning damages in the appellate court sample (Study 1), the ratio of punitive 
Figure 3. Participants’ self-reported intent for punitive damages to punish 
the defendant (i.e., retribution), to deter the defendant (i.e., specific deter-
rence), and to deter others (i.e., general deterrence) across injury severity 
conditions.
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damages to compensatory damages did not differ dramatically from the state court data 
(m = 0.8:1 [Study 1] vs. m = 0.945:1 [Eisenberg et al., 2002]).
Severity Differences in Liability and Damages
The defendant injury severity manipulation utilized in Study 2 allowed us to examine 
causal effects of defendant death on liability and damages decisions. Individuals are more 
likely to attribute blame to an actor when the actor’s actions result in a more severe out-
come than when those actions result in a less severe outcome (Robbennolt, 2000). In ad-
dition to attribution of responsibility, individuals are more likely to report that an actor 
deserves punishment (Robbennolt, 2000) and recommend higher penalties (Baldwin & 
Kleinke, 1994 [fines]; Bornstein, 1998 [punitive damages]) when the outcome of the actor’s 
behavior is more severe. However, these studies were conducted without a manipulation 
of the harmdoer’s own injury severity.
Although participants in Study 2 rated the defendant’s injuries as progressively more 
severe across the three injury severity conditions, the likelihood of the defendant being 
found liable for punitive damages did not differ across these conditions. Punitive damage 
awards also did not vary across conditions.
Participant perceptions of plaintiff injury severity did predict liability decisions, how-
ever. Stronger perceptions of plaintiff injury severity were associated with a higher like-
lihood of finding the defendant liable for punitive damages. Although the relationship 
only approached significance, the trend was such that stronger perceptions of defendant 
injury severity were also associated with higher findings of punitive liability. These find-
ings lend further support to the positive association between outcome severity and fault 
attribution or punishment recommendations (Robbennolt, 2000), but they fail to demon-
strate a causal relationship between defendant injury severity and punishment decisions. 
Further, they fail to support a relationship between outcome severity and the degree of 
punishment; defendant injury severity did not influence punitive damage awards.
If one considers punitive damage awards to be the sum of the monetary values neces-
sary for retribution, specific deterrence, and general deterrence, then mock jurors in the 
defendant death condition should have awarded less than those in the survival condition 
because retribution and specific deterrence would be unnecessary. As suggested in Tillert 
v. Lippert (1996), jurors would only need to determine an amount necessary for general 
deterrence when the defendant is deceased. Not all courts suggest that damage awards 
should differ as a function of defendant survival, however (e.g., Haralson v. Fisher Survey-
ing, Inc., 2001). Instead, a trier of fact should be aware of and should consider the defen-
dant’s death, but there is no indication of how this should happen.
Rationale and Juror Intentions
Courts discussed their rationale for allowing or barring punitive damages against de-
ceased defendants in their written decisions (Study 1), while mock jurors reported their 
intentions for the awards across the injury severity conditions (Study 2). Courts that re-
jected the notion of punitive damages following the death of the defendant mostly argued 
that such damages were not appropriate because the dead are beyond retribution (e.g., 
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Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 2002) and that allowing punitive damages against the heirs would 
be punishing the wrong party (e.g., Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 2003). However, several 
courts that allowed punitive damages to follow the death of the defendant emphasized 
the value of general deterrence (e.g., Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 2001; Kaopuki v. Ke-
aloha, 2003). Critics of this viewpoint suggest that general deterrence relies on retribution, 
thus punitive damages would serve no role if the plaintiff is deceased (e.g., Byrd v. Lohr, 
1986; Doe v. Colligan, 1998).
Consistent with the majority of court decisions, mock jurors’ self-reported intentions 
for punitive damage awards differed across defendant injury severity conditions. Prior 
research has demonstrated that mock jurors generally intend for punitive damages to 
serve all three roles and weigh these intentions relatively equally (e.g., Greene, Coon, & 
Bornstein, 2001; Green, Johns, & Smith, 2001). In contrast, mock jurors in Study 2 reported 
a stronger intent for retribution and specific deterrence when the defendant survived the 
accident than when the defendant was deceased. These findings suggest some compre-
hension of the instructions concerning punitive damages, and some awareness of the po-
tential for punitive damages to serve a role of general deterrence, but not other purposes, 
when a defendant is deceased.
On the other hand, participants’ self-reported intentions to punish and deter the defen-
dant were not negligible in the defendant death condition, which is consistent with argu-
ments that jurors are not entirely rational in awarding punitive damages (e.g., Sunstein et 
al., 2002). However, mock jurors’ decisions concerning punitive damages were predictable 
in Study 2. For example, both perceptions of the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and of 
the seriousness of the defendant’s behaviors predicted punitive liability judgments. The 
former is associated with decisions to punish (Robbennolt, 2000), and the latter is a factor 
jurors are expected to consider when assessing punitive damages.
Policy Recommendations and Implications
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issues have barred punitive dam-
ages against deceased defendants, but courts usually must interpret civil statutes that are 
silent on the issue. As is evident from Study 1, courts have conflicting interpretations of 
this statutory silence. However, when provided with explicit statutory language, courts 
have followed the legislatures’ intentions (e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 1977; Gordon v. Nathan, 1974; 
In Re Thomas, 1999). Appellate decisions (Study 1) and mock juror judgments (Study 2) in-
dicate that jurors are willing to award punitive damages against deceased defendants. 
We recommend, as others have suggested (e.g., Harrell v. Bowen, 2006), that state legisla-
tive bodies utilize explicit language concerning punitive damages and defendant death in 
their survival statutes. The inclusion of explicit directives in the survival statutes, espe-
cially in jurisdictions that have not considered this issue in appellate courts, could min-
imize appeals. Moreover, explicit language would prevent judicial misinterpretation of 
legislative intent.
We also recommend greater judicial guidance to jurors who must calculate punitive 
damages, generally, and especially those who must calculate punitive damages against a 
deceased defendant. The Supreme Court of Arizona suggested that jurors could consider 
the toll a punitive damage award may have on the defendant’s heirs but did not indicate 
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whether awards should be lower than if the defendant had survived (Haralson v. Fisher 
Surveying, Inc., 2001). In only one decision (i.e., Tillert v. Lippert, 1996) did the court imply 
that the jury should determine punitive damage awards meant only to serve as an exam-
ple. These issues should be made explicit in jury instructions.
Limitations and Future Directions
In Study 1, we relied strictly on appellate cases, which prevented us from a thorough ex-
amination of jurors’ legal decisions regarding punitive damages against a deceased de-
fendant. To buffer this limitation, we utilized a simulation study (Study 2) with partic-
ipants acting as mock jurors, allowing us to examine causal effects of defendant injury 
severity on punitive damage decisions. Study 2 was not without limitations of its own. 
Simulation studies, generally, are criticized for lacking ecological validity and real-world 
consequences (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005; Vidmar, 2008). For instance, we examined de-
cisions of individual mock jurors without deliberation; jurors may adjust predelibera-
tion decisions during the deliberation process (see e.g., Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, 
2000). Reviews of mock jury research have demonstrated few systematic differences as a 
function of methodological verisimilitude (Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein & McCabe, 2005), 
but such issues are nonetheless a paramount concern when courts and policy makers 
evaluate social science research (Monahan & Walker, 2005). Future research on the topic 
should, therefore, utilize more realistic procedures, such as presenting trial material on 
video and the inclusion of group deliberation.
Courts were split on whether punitive damages could serve a role of general deter-
rence without having a retributive effect, and one court questioned whether punitive 
damages can serve as a general deterrent at all. If retribution is necessary for general de-
terrence, as some courts suggest (e.g., Byrd v. Lohr, 1986; Doe v. Colligan, 1988), and espe-
cially if there is no general deterrent effect of punitive damages (see Morfesi v. Sherman, 
1991), then punitive damages should obviously not follow the death of a defendant as a 
means of general deterrence. Thus, we would encourage further exploration of the inter-
action between general deterrence and retribution, in terms of both public policy and ju-
ror psychology.
Future research on outcome severity and legal decisions could be useful. Specifically, 
researchers should explore the role of defendant injury severity in these decisions. Al-
though a plaintiff’s injuries may be relevant to some legal decisions (e.g., determining 
compensatory damages), the defendant’s injuries have less relevance, especially in cases 
of pure negligence. Nonetheless, effects of a defendant’s injuries, or lack thereof, may 
help to elucidate the reasons behind the relationship between outcome severity and attri-
bution of responsibility.
The current findings do not enable us to speculate as to how jurors might perceive cor-
porate defendants. Some of the cited cases involved corporate defendants; the deceased 
wrongdoer being a representative of the company (e.g., Harslson v. Fisher Surveying Inc., 
2001; Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 1979), but extensions to the current research might 
have more relevance to corporate defendants than these findings. Corporations cannot 
suffer death or physical injuries, but they can suffer economically. For example, a phar-
maceutical company who knowingly releases a potentially dangerous drug might suf-
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fer financially if news of the intentional conduct breaks. Mock jurors are not necessarily 
sympathetic to corporate defendants (see e.g., Bornstein, 1998), but the economic con-
sequences of the company’s decision might have a deterrent effect without a lawsuit. If 
the company changed its behaviors but was nonetheless sued, a corporate analogy of the 
current research might be that jurors consider the injuries already suffered by the corpo-
ration. Future research on corporate harm before lawsuits involving punitive damage 
claims would be an appropriate extension of the current studies.
Conclusions 
Through both an analysis of legal decisions and a simulation study, we examined the re-
lationship between defendant death and punitive damage decisions. While a large ma-
jority of appellate courts have held against allowing punitive damages to follow a de-
fendant’s death, some jurisdictions do allow them, and mock jurors do not distinguish 
between a deceased and a surviving defendant. Nonetheless, courts generally argue that 
punitive damages are a useful tool for achieving general deterrence, and mock jurors 
rated their intentions in awarding punitive damages differently depending on whether 
the defendant was dead or alive. These findings suggest some confusion on the part of 
both courts and jurors about the propriety of awarding punitive damages against de-
ceased defendants. Legislative bodies could clear up this confusion by employing more 
explicit language in survival statutes, thereby preventing the need for judicial and juridic 
“mind-reading.”
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